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In the Supreme Court of the Slate of Utah
UTAH STEEL & IRON COMP ANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

CASE
NO. 11958

- vs. -

SKYLl.t'\E CONSTRlTCTION COMP.\XY,
Def enrlmlf-Respo11d1'·1d,

BRIEF

STATEJ\rEN'T OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action by a steel materialman against a
general contractor claiming $2642.69 due on two separate
contracts.

DTSPOSITION IN LO-\VER COURT
ThP 'I'ltircl District Court in and for Salt Lake Coun-

ty, the Honorahl<> Leonard vV. Elton, sitting without a
.inry, on October 22, 19G9, entered judgment (styled "DeCl'PP") for plaintiff for $Gll.99, plus interest thereon at

2

6% from September 9, 19G7 and costs (R-18). On dPfentlant's motion to retax costs and to anwnd
thP
Court, on December 9, 1969, amended the judgment to allow interest from September 9, 1967 only on $159.00 of the
$611.99 judgment and disallo>Yed a $6.60 witn<'ss fet·
claimed by plaintiff's president (R-23). Plaintiff appeal:'
only from the judgment of December 9, 19G9 (R-26).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-respondent prays the judgnwnt be affirmed and that defendant recover its cosfa on this appeal.
FACTS
Plaintiff's hrief states only the evidence favorable to
it. Since the Court found the issues in defendant's favor,
defendant must restate the facts.
The parties entered into a written contract for plaintiff materialman to furnish 80 rocket rails to dPfendant
general contractor on a joh for the U. S. Government (R35). 'The rails were each 74.5 feet long, and used to
rockets into a storage facility, much like railroad tra('k

(R-90). Plaintiff's contract was $.J.5,506.88 (R-1) plus
$7 4.00 in extras ( R-1, 115). Defendant paid $44,030.19
(R-1, 10) and made a disputed bachharge of $1,09i.iG

for \\·rlcling the rocket rails, leaving a balance of $452.99

\rhicli <1f'f Pndant sent to plaintiff hy check dated ,January
8. 19G8, marked "rocket assembly account in full." Plaintiff hpt the ch<'ck and produced it in Court on trial on
Odoher 20, 1969 (R--±3, -1-4). Plaintiff admitted that del'r·ndant ha(l a1wa;·s tendered and offen•d to pay the
$-l-5:!.D9 and did not clis1rnte the hackcharge until counsPl
\ntS hin•d in
19G8 (R-63, 6--1).
,\clditionnlly, and on a separat<' joh in August, 1967,
tl1e E .rnnston, \Vyoming High
plaintiff suppliP<l
six: mda1 lrn1rkptf.; to defendant's sp0cial order. Price for
the furnishing 1vas never discussed and defendant thought
plaintiif was volunteering to supply tlwrn as a good will
gesture to influenc0 the awarding of other work to plaintiff (R-98). In February, 1968, when plaintiff's counsel
wrote dPmanding payment of $2,642.69, defendant inquin•d of a $1,092 charge included therein and learned
for the first tinw plaintiff claimed $1,092 for the brackets
(R-08, 100). Defendant produced expert testimony that

the six brackets could be bought for $69.00 (R-85), so de·
fendant disputed this bill.
'T'lte $1,097.70 disputed backcharge, the $1,092.00 dis-

pnt('d charges for the brackets plus the $-±52.99 tendered
<'Olll]Hise plaintiff\.; total complaint of $2,642.69 (R-1).
rl'he <>videnee in <letail follows.
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The respective Presidents of the parties nwt (R-GO).
Brewer, plaintiff's President, said installation of the
rocket rails '''ould be the tough phase of defrndant's contract and that if plaintiff could supply the 80 rails in 80
single pieces, it would save defendant considerable money
(R-88), for if supplied in pieces it would be very expPnsive to align and weld them togetlwr in the fi<>ld (R-120).
Plaintiff's agreement to furnish the rails in om' pi<>c<' war.: a
great influence in defendant's awarding the <'ontract to
plaintiff. ( R-89).

A written contract, signed by each party's President,
was executed (R-35), specifically requiring the rocket
rails to be furnished in one piece ( R-36). The contract
said:
"The contractor may add to or deduct from the
amount of work covered by this agreement, and
any changes made in the work involved shall he
by a written amendment hereto setting forth in detail the changes involved and the value thereof,
which shall be mutually agreed upon hetwern the
contractor and subcontractor if such be possible,
but if such mutual agrc->cment is not possible, tlwn
the value of the work shall he determined as provided in Section S." ( R-60).
According to Bre"·er, following signing of tl1r cnntract, James :M ahas came to plaintiff's officr, and, as
BreW('r did not know him at the time, indentified hirnsrlf as thr def(•nclant's superint<'ndPnt on the rocket as-

5
;;emhly joh and asked that thP rails be shipped in two
pieces (R-:37). Bre'.ver did not ask the superintendent if
]ip ha<l authority to make this change in the written contract and di<l not check with anyone at Skyline to see if
J1ad the authority (R-Gl).
Brewer had known defendant's PrPsidPnt, Holbrook, and its Secretary, Bud Mahas,
t'or )·ears ( 1{-GO).
though his contract negotiations

Jiad

lJPPn

mad\' \\'i th H olhrook and ewn though he did not

kno\r ,J a11ws

ahas, Brew0r "assmnPd '' .J anws had au-

tliorit)- to modify the writt(•Jl contract signed by Holbrook
1H-·Hi).

Three to four weeks later, in Junr, 19G7, plaintiff
;;hipped tlw rails in two pieces (R-59) although there was
;;till no writtt>n anwndnwnt or written change order to the

\\Titten contract or other contact with anyone on behalf
of Jpfrndant hut .Ja11ws (R-Gl).

W1H•n tlw rails arrivPd at the johsite each in two
]JiPees, 1lolhrook called Brewer. Brewer declined to weld
th(• rajjs at tht> jobsite, but admitted $1,000 would be
('harged if plaintiff did the work (R-45). Defendant's

actual cltargP for doing the work was $1,097.20, the rea'·onahlP eost thPrefor (R-95, 9G). Defendant backcharged

that amount to plaintiff and on January 8, l9G8, sent
Jilaintiff a d1eek for tht> $4-52.99 balance due on the rocket

l'tlil eontrad after tlw backchargP.
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Defendant denied Jam es l\[ahas ordered the
shipped in two piec0s. There was no reason so to do (R100). All changes or anything incidental to the job werp
reported in the foreman's daily report kept daily h.v tlw
job superintendent and there was no indication of
change in the contract on the job but was indication to
backcharge plaintiff (R-93, 9-!). .James l\fahas, as joh
superintendent, did not have authority to permit thP rocket rails to be shipped in pieces (R-63). Bn'\rt•r testified
the reason he did not ask J a.mes if he had authority to
make the change, but "assmned h<> must have had the
power to do this" (R-46), was that "the superintendent
usually has authority to change something if it doesn't
cost more money" (R-61). Here it did cost $1097.70 mon'
money.
'.ln September, 1967, defendant's need for six metal
brackets arose when plaintiff's President, Brewer, happened to be in defendant's offieP. Brewer said his shop
was down on work and that lw could get the hrackets right
out. Brewer was trying to get a subcontraet on the Evanston High 8chool job from dPfendaTit and defendant wao;
under the impression that Brewer would supply the
brackets as a good will gPsture. Price was never discussed. Defendant usually had this type of work done hy
persons other than plaintiff and sources were n•adil;:
available for such (R-97, 98).
In February, 1968, defendant reeeived a demand
from plaintiff's counsd for $2,G.:l-2.G9 including an item
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of $1,092. Defendant, having received no such invoice,
irnhd plaintiff's counsel for explanation and received an
invoice hack dated September 9, 1967 of $1,092 for six
hraekets (H-98, 100). Defendant presented expert testimon>, that tlw r<:>asonahle market price for producing the
hrackets was $11.50 each, including $7.00 labor, $3.00
materials and $1.50 profit, or a total of $G9.00 (R-80, 82,
Plaintiff's Prt>sident testified that he made the six
lm:ickds for a total cof't of $170 (R-5-1-), hut he added into
tlw hill $900 for "loss causPd hy inh•rruption of other
\rork" ( H- U, 5-1-). He admittt•d def Pndant could have purchased tlw six hrackds for $250 els('where (R-57). Brewer denied that the smding of thr invoice for $1,092 had
to do with his finding out how much the backeharge of $1,097.20 was on the other job (R-52).
Defendant moyed for a continuance to produce .Jim
:'.\Iahas as a \\ritness. Plaintiff resisted and the trial
Comt denied the motion (R-345). The parties at trial
waived findings of fact and conclusions of law (R-136)
and all (•xhibits were withdra-vyn. (R-17).
On October 22, 1969, the trial Court entered judgment against defendant for $611.99 with interest thereon
from Septemh<•r 9, 1967 and costs (R-18). Defeindant ob.ieetc>d to the witness fee claimed by plaintiff for its president Brewer and to the allowance of interest on the
$-l-52.99 bv motion to amend
On December 9, 1969,
the 'rrial Court disallowed the claimed witness fee for
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Brewer and amended the judgment of October 22 to allow
interest only on the $159.00 from September 9, 1967, but
not on the $452.99.
Plaintiff's notice of appeal appeals from the ''judgment entered in the above-entitled matter on or about
the 9th day of December, 1969" and not the judgment of
October 22, 1969 (R-26).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

PLAINTIFF IS PRECLUDED FROM APPEALING

ALLOWANCE OF DEFENDANT'S BACKCHARGE
FOR WELDING.

Plaintiff's notice of appeal designates only the judgment of December 9, 1969, as the judgment appealed. All
the order of that date did was reduce the costs and interest allowed plaintiff but not affect the allowance to defendant of its backcharge. Until the brief -..vas filed herein, defendant had no notice that plaintiff was appealing
from anything other than the reduction of interest and
costs. Rule 73 (b) U.R.C.P. requires an appellant to designate the judgmPnt or part thereof appealed from. Nun-

ley v. Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 126, 388 P.
2d 798 held that where the later

judgment was void

and different from the earlier valid judgment, defendants, having served notice of appeal designating the later

THE
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ju<lgment, were not entitled to contest on appeal the earlier judt,rinrnt. That is the case here, for had defendant
known plaintiff was appealing from the judgment of
Septemher 9, 19G9, allowing defendant's backcharge, defendant ·would have cross appealed on the award to plaintiff of morP than $452. and any costs.
POINT IL
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING DEFENDANT'S BACKCHARGE FOR WELDING.

Plaintiff's appeal in this regard is merely rearguing
the facts in plaintiff's favor and disregarding the conflieting evidence in defendant's favor, even though the
trial Court found the fact issues in defendant's favor.
There is eviden<'e that defendant's superintendent, Jim
niahas, did not request plaintiff to ship the rails in two
pieees (R-93). There is evidence he did not have authority so to do (R-9::3). Defendant wanted them delivered in
one piece (Rl21) and the written contract so specifically
m1uired (R-34). Brewer had known defendant's officers
for years and had dealt specifically with them on this
1nitten contract, but says he relied on defendant's superintPndPnt, whom he did not know bPfore, for verbal change
in thP writtPn contract, did not ask the superintendent if
had authority to change the contract, did not check
with d0fendant'::-; officPrs to see if the superintendant was
authorized, although he had a month so to do, and did not
ohtain
sort of writing as to the modification in the
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next month. The scope of apparent authority and wlwthei·
plaintiff reasonahly relied thereon a.n• qut>stions of fart
for the trial Court. Certainly, l>laintiff cannot rPly PXclusively on the agent for estahlishrnrnt of the :-:rove of
the agent's authority.
The evidence here fairly supports tlw judgment anrl
appellant's point is, therefore, not wt>ll tahn.
POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISALLOWING THE
WITNESS FEE OF PRESIDENT BREWER.

Brewer was the principal stockholder and president
of plaintiff and was the only witness rPpresenting plaintiff on trial. He remained in the courtroom during the'
trial as a party not 'Nithstanding invo('ation of the rule
excluding witnesses, Rule -1-3(f), U.RC.P. (R-23).

Western Crramery Co. v. J.llnlia, 89 Utah ..J.22, 57 P.
2d 7-13 (193G) approves authority that one who attends
court as the agent of a party, necessarily attending to thr
conduct of a suit, cannot be allowed witness feps although
he testifies. It further

that compensation will be al-

lowed a corporate offic<'r who attends m; a witness in tht·
corporation's behalf where the corporation i::; a party ln1t
in which the witness has no private interest, unless tlw
witness is in

('OU rt

nrr(•ssarily attending to thr conduct of
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the suit. St>e 57 ALR 2d 1245 for cases holding that the
president of the plaintiff corporation is not entitled to
witness fees, that every case must stand on its own merits,
and that the executive or other officer of a corporation
who appears in court in a representative capacity is de
facto in court as the corporation and is not entitled to
1ritness f et>s.
Stratton Ii. West Sfotes Constrn,cti.on, 21Utah2d 60,
..WO P.:2d 117, cited by plaintiff, is not in point. That case
holds tl1e prt>sident cannot he personally held liable for
the corporate fraud vd1en he was not acting for his own
hencfit, whereas, here, plaintiff corporation is seeking a
personal benefit for its own president for his performance of his duties as president for and on behalf of plaintiff corporation. The next sentence of the Str.atton case
is much more aptly quoted than the one plaintiff quoted,
for it says ''A corporation can act only through its
ag1mts."

Where the statute does not define the items of recoverable cost, the allowance or disallowance thereof is
confided to the discretion of the trial court, which will
not he lfo;turbed on appeal unless abused. 20 Am. Jur. 2d,
section 52, p. 41. See Rickenberg v. Capital Garagr, (:)8 Utah 30, 2-J-9 P. 121.
POINT IV.
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISALLOWING INTEREST ON THE $452.99 TENDERED TO
PLAINTIFF.
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Defendant sent the $-152.99 cheek to plaintiff as full
payment on the rockPt rail joh. rr110 Conrt found that to
be full payment on that job and allO\n•d plaintiff an additional $159 for the brackds on the E·rnnston High Nchool
job. Plantiff kept defendant's cheek and rdnrned it aftel'
trial. No objection \\"as ever rnadP to t]1c form of th\•
tender and no question whatenT was raist-d as to the fad
that defendant had always offered and tPnclPred to pay
that amount (R-50). Defendant's answer all('gt-d priol'
and continued
tender to plaintiff of that amount (R10).
Rule 68 (a) 8ays that if deft-ndant alleges in its answer that before emmnenct>ment of the action he tendered
to plaintiff the full amount to ·which plaintiff was entitled
and thereupon deposits it in court, and the allegation
found true, plaintiff cannot r0covcr costs, hut must paY
costs to defendant. That n1le d(WS not govern interest.
Even if it did, plaintiff pr<>eluded clPfondant from depositing the money into court by
defendant's check
and by failing to request it he paid into Court in the light
of the tender pleaded in the ans\\-Pr. See
U.C.A.
1953.

In Hirsh v. Ogden Furm"ture, 48 Utah 4.'3-1:, 160 Pac.
283 (1916), this Court lwld that a plaintiff may wain·
his right of having the money paid into Court to perfect
a tendc>r and that he docs so ordinarilv wht>n he fails tc
call the Con rt':-: attention to the fact that the money lta3
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not heen produced in Court hecause, under such circumstances, the money would in all probability be produced ir:
Court just as soon as plaintiff insists upon his right tu
have it there.
By the great \\-eight of authority, one who tenders
that which is due and ffwing prior to commencement of

snit eannot be held for costs and attorneys' fees. Home
Owners Lmm Corporation rs. WashingL;.i, 108 Utah

lGl P. 2d 355. Plaintiff's only demand for payment on
the brackets was for $1,092, which included $900 "for loss
of business". Plaintiff's own tPstirnony indicated this
figure was outrageous and unreasonable. The only indPpendent evidence indicated the true value of the units to
be $69.00. The trial Court was extremely generous in
allowing plaintiff $159 therefor and could well have found
them to be a favor as Defendant thought plaintiff was
furnishing the units free. Regardless of that, it is certain
that interest does not begin to run until proper demand
has been made for payment. Certainly plaintiff's $1,092
invoice is not such a proper demand. Under these circumstancps it is extremely burdensome and inequitable to
charge def Pndant with costs in the trial court of $33.40
or any interest whatever. Certainly the Trial Court did
not err in disallowing interest on the $452.99.

l -!

This whole
i:o-; frivilous. First, vlaintiff
waived findings of fact and eondusions of hrn:
to withdrawal of exhihits, and tlwn atkrnptcd to appeal.
'l'he ap1wal is from the ord(•r clisallowing some intPrPst
and costs, de rninimis matters, hnt plaintiff's lirid arguP:-:
as to the allowance to d.efendant of a haekf'haq"-c' of an:
amount rnueh larger than the jndgme>nt recoverPd h:·
plaintiff. As to that, plaintiff argues only the disputed
facts in plaintiff's favor. Defendant prevailPd in it,;
$1,097.70 setoff and shmn'd that it had always temleml
to plaintiff $±52.99 balance due on th0 onP joh invoked.
On the other job i1wolved plaintiff claimed and billed defendant an outrageous amount of $1,092.00, and ended up
\vith a $159 recovery.
This Court should not only affirm the 'l'rial Court
hut should award d(•frndant its eosts h0n·in. Plaintiff is
indeed fortunatP that tliP Court lwlow allO\Yed plaintiff
any interest and eo;-;b.
Respectfully sulnnitt('<l,
·woRSLEY, SNO\\T &

BY Joseph J. Palmer
.1t f nr11e11s

for H<'!-:JJ011dent

